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A model for the joint evolution of opinions and how much the agents trust each other is presented,
using the framework of the Continuous Opinions and Discrete Actions (CODA) model. Instead of a ﬁxed
probability that the other agents will decide in the favor of the best choice, each agent considers that
other agents might be one of two types: trustworthy or untrustworthy. Each agent its opinion and also
the probability for each one of the other agents it interacts with being trustworthy. The dynamics of
opinions and the evolution of the trust between the agents are studied. Clear evidences of the existence
of two phases, one with strong polarization and the other tending to agreement, are observed. The
transition shows signs of being a ﬁrst-order transition. This happens despite the fact that the trust
network evolves much slower than the opinion on the central issue.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Opinion dynamics models [1] are usually built on the idea that
each agent will inﬂuence others, either all of them, if one assumes
a complete graph of connections, or a set of all agents that com-
pose its neighborhood. In the most common case, agents somehow
change their opinions towards the opinion of those neighbors, ei-
ther by a simple imitative process in discrete models [2–5] or
moving the values of their opinion in the direction of the value of
the neighbor opinion, in the continuous models [6,7]. A mixed ver-
sion exists in the Continuous Opinions and Discrete Action (CODA)
model [8,9], where the continuous values are not observed and
only a discrete choice is known by the neighbors. CODA model
variations have been shown to be equivalent to the continuous
models [10] as well as a general case to the discrete models in
the literature [11].
However, it is not true that people always tend to copy those
they observe. Depending on their own characteristics and those of
the person one is interacting with, that observation might have
no consequences. Or it could also cause the person who observes
to reject the observed characteristic [12]. This idea has been im-
plemented in different ways in different models. No inﬂuence has
been coded as a threshold in the continuous Bounded Conﬁdence
models and as inﬂexible agents who don’t change their opinions
in discrete [13–15] and mixed [16] models. The negative inﬂuence
has also been studied by the introduction of “contrarians” [17–19]
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physleta.2013.07.007who change their opinions as if they wanted to oppose what they
observe and other models with contrarian-like effects [20]. In more
general terms, the problem of trust in opinion dynamics mod-
els has been explored for a number of different models [21–26].
In most cases mentioned here, the trust between agents is not
subject to the dynamics of the models, with exception of one
case [22]. Distinct approaches to avoid dealing with the trust prob-
lem include introducing information following in just one direc-
tion [27] or three classes of agents [28], where inﬂuence does
not happen between the opposed extremes (per example, between
leftists and centrists) [29–33].
It is clear, however, that, as our opinion about a certain subject
changes, so does our opinion about the person who inﬂuenced us.
And, in reverse, it is also true that we interpret the same infor-
mation differently depending on its source [34]. This can lead to
people being closer to those who share the same characteristics
or opinions, an observed fact known as homophily [35–38]. Here,
we will present a generalization of the CODA model where the
agents change their opinions about the issue and also about the
reliability of the other agents.
This will allow different ﬁnal states for the society of agents,
with both agreement or disagreement being observed in the long
run depending on the value of the parameters, as opposed to the
original CODA model. In a not strongly connected network, CODA
would always lead to disagreement, while, on a complete network,
consensus would always happen in the long run. But this is not
true on the real world, where many systems end with disagree-
ment even between neighbors, as evidenced by a series of studies
of the choices of electors in North-American national and commu-
nity based elections [39,40].
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The original CODA model [10,41] was obtained by assuming
that, in a situation where there were two possible choices (or ac-
tions), each agent considers there is a ﬁxed probability α > 0.5
that each one of its neighbors will have chosen the best alternative.
Let the two choices be A and B and let pi(t) be the probabil-
ity agent i assigns at time t to the probability that A is the best
choice. CODA adopts a ﬁxed likelihood α ≡ P (OA j |A), represent-
ing the chance that, if A is indeed the best choice, when observing
agent j, i will observe j chose A, indicated here by OA j . Assuming
that the problem is symmetrical in relation to both choices, that
is,
P (OA j|A) = P (O B j|B),
a simple use of Bayes’ Theorem will show how pi(t) is altered.
By using log-odd function ν ≡ ln( p1−p ) (where the agent index
and time dependence were omitted for brevity), a simple additive
model is obtained. This can be trivially normalized to ν∗ so that
when A is observed, the agent adds +1 to ν∗ , and when B is ob-
served, −1 is added. In this case, the choice is deﬁned simply by
the sign of ν∗ , with positive signs indicating A is chosen. Deﬁned
in this way, the model becomes actually independent of α, except
for translating the number of steps away from changing opinions
back into a probability. For the non-symmetrical case, the likeli-
hoods for choosing A or B could be different and, in this case,
the negative and positive steps will no longer have the same size.
While, in principle, one could use a normalization where one of
the steps is changed to a size of one, there is no strong reason
to do that, as the ﬁnal model will no longer be as simple as the
symmetric case.
Contrarians were previously introduced in the symmetrical case
simply by assigning a percentage of agents who actually reacted
with the opposite sign from the original model [18]. This is actu-
ally equivalent to a supposition that the contrarian neighbors are
more likely to be wrong than right, that is, they actually have a
likelihood of being right given by
μ = 1− α < 0.5. (1)
Of course, the assumption that μ and α add to one is a simplify-
ing one. It actually makes no difference in the dynamics of choices,
since, for each agent, in that model, one could deﬁne the renormal-
ized number of steps according to the agent own likelihoods. This
was due to the fact that each agent treated all other agents it in-
teracted with in the same way, contrarians, in the model, simply
believed their neighbors were more likely to be wrong than right.
However, if one wants to introduce the possibility that people
trust some people more than others, it makes sense to introduce a
trust matrix τi j that represents how much agent i thinks agent j is
likely to be more reliable than untrustworthy. That is, according to
agent i there is a probability τi j that the choices of agent j have a
probability α > 0.5 of being right (that is that agent j is trustwor-
thy (T )) and a probability 1− τi j that those choices have a chance
μ < 0.5 of being the best ones ( j is untrustworthy U ). Each agent
believes there are two types of agents, trustworthy agents T who
are likely to make the right choices, and untrustworthy U , more
likely to choose wrong. In both cases, the agents realize that there
is a probability that each of its neighbors will not act according to
its character, that is, trustworthy agents have a chance to be wrong
(1 − α) and untrustworthy agents have a chance to pick the best
choice randomly also (μ).
Obtaining the update rule in this case is a simple application
of Bayes’ Theorem, as per the framework in the CODA model [9].
Each agent i believes at time t the chance that A is the best choiceis given by pi(t). At that time, it observes an agent j, whom i be-
lieves has a probability τi j of being of the T type, meaning j would
chose A with probability α and B with probability 1 − α. If agent
j is a type U , which happens with probability 1− τi j , it would, in-
stead, choose A with probability μ and B with probability 1− μ.
Assuming that OA j is observed, that is, that j is observed to
prefer A, agent i will update its probability pi(t) to pi(t + 1) ob-
tained by applying Bayes’ Theorem and given by
pi(t + 1) = p[τi jα + (1− τi j)μ]p[τi jα + (1− τi j)μ] + (1− p)[τi j(1− α) + (1− τi j)(1− μ)] ,
(2)
where p is written in the place of pi(t) for brevity sake. One in-
teresting effect here is that Bayes’ theorem also applies to τi j and
the agent i also updates its opinion about how likely j is to be
trustworthy. We have a new τi j(t + 1) given by
τi j(t + 1) = τi j[pα + (1− p)(1− α)]τi j[pα + (1− p)(1− α)] + (1− τi j)[pμ + (1− p)(1− μ)] .
(3)
It makes sense to ask what happens if one adopts the same
transformation to log-odds. By calculating p/(1− p), one does get
rid of the numerator and taking the logarithm does lead us to an
additive model. That is, for νi(t) = ln(p/(1− p)), we have
νi(t + 1) = νi(t) + ln
[
τi jα + (1− τi j)μ
τi j(1− α) + (1− τi j)(1− μ)
]
.
If one takes τi j = 1, that is, certainty that all neighbors are trust-
worthy, the equation above has a simple constant additive part as
second term, the constant size of the step. However, in the gen-
eral case, the term will change at each interaction since it depends
on τi j . Similarly, the additive term equation for θ ≡ ln(τ/(1 − τ ))
depends on p and will change with the dynamics. This makes it
simpler to work directly with the probabilities p and τ , instead of
using log-odds.
In the original CODA model, using p as the main variable was
not a good idea also because it approached 0 or 1 too fast, so that
computational limitations on the representation of real numbers
became a real problematic issue. As a matter of fact, it was usual
to obtain values like 1–10−300, that, in any computer, is indistin-
guishable from 1.0. The same was not true for ν , meaning it was
a much better variable to use. As we will see bellow in the simu-
lation results, when introducing the possibility the neighbor could
be untrustworthy, the probabilities do not move to such problem-
atic zones and, therefore, we will not use log-odds from now on,
with no trouble other than the lack of simpliﬁcation of the ﬁnal
model.
Finally, if, instead of OA j , we have that agent j preference is B ,
with O B j being observed, we have, instead of Eqs. (2) and (3), the
following update rules:
pi(t + 1) = p[τi j(1− α) + (1− τi j)(1− μ)]p[τi j(1− α) + (1− τi j)(1− μ)] + (1− p)[τi jα + (1− τi j)μ] ,
(4)
and
τi j(t + 1) = τi j[p(1− α) + (1− p)α]τi j[p(1− α) + (1− p)α] + (1− τi j)[p(1− μ) + (1− p)μ] .
(5)
These rules are applied every time another agent is observed,
meaning that both the probability and the trust get updated at
every iteration. The general effects of one single update can be
seen in Figs. 1 and 2. Fig. 1 shows the symmetrical case where α =
1 − μ, showing between the two panels, the difference in effect
A.C.R. Martins / Physics Letters A 377 (2013) 2333–2339 2335Fig. 1. Vector ﬁeld showing the direction of the effects of one update for α = 0.6 and μ = 0.4 depending on the different initial opinions of agent i. Left panel: Agent j
prefers A. Right panel: Agent j prefers B .
Fig. 2. Vector ﬁeld showing the direction of the effects of one update depending on the different initial opinions of agent i. In every case, agent j prefers A. Left panel:
α = 0.75 and μ = 0.4. Right panel: α = 0.6 and μ = 0.25.that one obtains by agent j choosing either A or B . As we can see,
the reasonable assumption that the decisions will have opposite
effects is shown to be a good one, although a numerical inspection
will show they do not cancel each other exactly. We can also see
that the fact that agent j prefers A will only make A more likely
for i, increasing pi , when i trusts j to be more trustworthy than
untrustworthy (τi j > 0.5). Otherwise, i will move in the opposite
direction to that of j opinion, making it a local contrarian.
Fig. 2 shows us two non-symmetrical cases (α = 1− μ). As we
can see, the effect of the type of agent with the likelihood (α or μ)
further from 0.5 is stronger. This translates to the fact that, when
trustworthy agents are considered to be certain more often and
untrustworthy ones are closer to a coin ﬂip, agent i will change
its opinion as a contrarian only if its trust on j is very low. The
opposite happens when the untrustworthy agents are considered
to choose the worst choice more often than the trustworthy ones
choose the better one.
One should notice that these are just the results of one update.
As the system evolves, some agents will randomly interact more
often with agents choosing A and others with agents choosing B .
This means each one will be, at ﬁrst, led to a different region of
the p–τ plane and, therefore, it is not clear, just from looking at
the arrow ﬁelds, what will happen in the system as a whole.
3. Simulation results
The original CODA model was, in previous works, deﬁned on
a network that dictated the neighbors that each agent could in-
teract with. This was necessary as it was the appearance of local
self-reinforcing neighborhoods that kept consensus from appear-
ing and allowed extreme different beliefs to evolve and co-exist.
A fully connected model would trivially lead to a consensus around
the random size that started bigger, with all agents strongly sup-
porting it after a while.
Here, however, we are also interested in the dynamics of the
trust between the agents. In the original model, we can considerthat only the pre-assigned neighbors were considered to have in-
formation worthy of obtaining. But, in the general case, that can
be an effect of the dynamics. In order to explore that, complete
graphs will be assumed in the simulations presented here, so that
every agent will be able to interact with every other agent. The
goal is to explore if consensus appears or if the agents will natu-
rally divide themselves into groups of agents with similar opinions.
Simulations were performed using the software R [42]; the
package “ﬁelds” [43] was used to generate the arrow graphics.
In the simulations, two distinct agents were randomly drawn at
each step and the ﬁrst agent updated it probabilities from the ob-
servation of the second. Time t is measured as the number of steps
divided by the number of agents N , so that advancing t by one
means that, on average, each agent observed one other agent once.
The initial values of p in most simulations were randomly drawn
from a uniform distribution between 0.01 and 0.99, except when
noted otherwise. In the simulations presented here, one agent i
is randomly drawn at each iteration and it observes an agent j
choice, where j is also obtained randomly. Only the choice is ob-
served and not the actual probability p j . Once this is repeated N
times, the value of t is increased by one.
Fig. 3 shows the temporal evolution of one realization of a sym-
metric case, where α = 1 − μ = 0.55 and all N = 1000 agents
starting with τi j = 0.5 for all values of i and j. We see that, in this
case, at ﬁrst, even after an average of 200 interactions per agent,
the probabilities are still randomly distributed over all possible
values. As a comparison, without trust, the CODA model showed
regions starting to stabilize with strong opinions as soon as t = 20.
Around t = 50, most opinions were already very strong (p close to
0 or 1) and the general format of the distribution of choices would
remain the same from that point on [8].
With the introduction of trust, we see that the opinions even-
tually tend to the extremes, but even at T = 500, we still have a
signiﬁcant but diminishing number of agents with moderate opin-
ions. However, those moderate opinions tend to disappear, as we
can see from the case where t = 1000. And this is another impor-
2336 A.C.R. Martins / Physics Letters A 377 (2013) 2333–2339Fig. 3. Temporal evolution of the histograms showing the distribution of observed pi after different amounts of simulation time for N = 1000. In all cases, α = 1− μ = 0.55
and all agents started with τi j = 0.5 for all values of i and j. Left panel: t = 200. Central panel: t = 500. Right panel: t = 1000.
Fig. 4. Histograms showing the distribution of observed pi for two different cases when T = 50. In all cases, agents started with τi j = 0.5 for all values of i and j. Left panel:
α = 1− μ = 0.55. Right panel: α = 0.70 and μ = 0.45.tant difference, since moderate opinions never really disappeared
in the original CODA algorithm, as they survived in the interface
between the extreme regions. Here, on the other hand, all agents
eventually make up their minds and, as we will see, learn to mis-
trust those who disagree with them.
However, unlike previous implementations, the introduction of
trust allows a different behavior to appear, depending on the pa-
rameters. Fig. 4 shows the distribution when T = 50 for two dif-
ferent cases, α = 1 − μ = 0.55 at left and α = 0.70 and μ = 0.55
at right. What we see is that, in the ﬁrst case, as expected, too lit-
tle time has passed and the system is at a similar, undecided state,
as it will still be when T = 200. However, the situation for the sec-
ond, non-symmetrical case, is quite different. One peak of strong
opinions is clearly formed near p = 0, but none appeared around
p = 1.0. As a matter of fact, very few agents keep an opinion in fa-
vor of A (p > 0.5) and the system is close to reaching a consensus.
Running that case a little longer indeed leads the system to a full
agreement, in this case, in favor of B . This happens because the
agents consider that the information of trustworthy agents is far
more reliable than the contrarian information of the untrustwor-
thy ones, that is μ is much closer to 0.5 than α. This initial better
evaluation of their peers makes it possible for the agents to reach
an agreement before they start having strong opinions and/or mis-
trusting each other.
Fig. 5 shows the ﬁnal results for different cases. All graphics
depict the average over 20 realization of the observed standard de-
viation of pi as a function of the initial trust τi j , chosen equal for
all agents at the beginning. When all agents agree, all pi are equal
or very close and, therefore, the standard deviation tends to zero.
The opposite extreme has half of agents with pi = 0 and the otherhalf with pi = 1, for a standard deviation of 0.5. The left panel
shows the same case run with different number N of agents and
t = 1000. The ﬁgure looks like it corresponds to a ﬁnite case as-
sociated with a ﬁrst order transition between complete agreement
among the agents, when the trust starts high enough, and polar-
ization between two disagreeing groups when trust starts low. The
right panel shows, for N = 200 that the value of τi j where the
transition seems to happen depends also on the initial conditions
imposed on pi .
When the agents start with moderate opinions, closer to 0.5,
it is easier for agreement to happen. However, if the agents start
with an initial very strong opinion towards one of the options,
agreement is only possible if trust starts also high, so that agents
with different choices can still inﬂuence each other. The same basic
behavior was observed in every case run in the tests of the trust
model, showing those results are quite robust. While the CODA
model would always lead to agreement in a complete graph and to
polarization if interaction were local, with self-reinforcing neigh-
borhoods, here we can observe both results in the same model,
depending on the initial level of trust in the population. It is in-
teresting to notice that this means that consensus is easier to be
achieved when initial opinions are weaker, that is, when we have
uniformed individuals, as it has been previously proposed [44].
Another way to see the effects of the parameters on the dy-
namics of the system can be found in Fig. 6. The ﬁgure shows the
standard deviations of the ﬁnal probabilities for different values of
α and ν . All cases were run with N = 100 agents starting with
τi j = 0.5 for every i and j, and values of p randomly drawn in
between 0.01 and 0.99. Each square shows the average of 40 real-
izations that were left to run up to t = 1000 average interactions
A.C.R. Martins / Physics Letters A 377 (2013) 2333–2339 2337Fig. 5. Standard deviation of pi as a function of initial trust τi j . In all cases, α = 1− μ = 0.55. Left panel: Effect of different number of agents N . Right panel: Different initial
conditions for pi are shown. In the spread condition, each pi was randomly drawn from a uniform distribution between 0.01 and 0.99; for the close case, between 0.4
and 0.6, while the extreme case had pi drawn uniformly in the regions between 0 and 0.01 and between 0.99 and 1.0.
Fig. 6. Standard deviations of the ﬁnal probabilities for different values of α and ν . The colors range from white (disagreement, standard deviation of 0.5) to red (agreement,
standard deviation of 0). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this Letter.)
Fig. 7. Temporal evolution of the histograms showing the distribution of observed τi j after different amounts of simulation time for N = 100. In all cases, α = 1 − μ = 0.55
and all agents started with τi j = 0.5 for all values of i and j. Left panel: T = 100. Right panel: t = 1000.per agent, with white corresponding to disagreement in every real-
ization, and red to consensus in all of them. We can see that, as the
information from T agents become more reliable, the tendency to
agreement increases. However, as the U agents are supposed to
make more mistakes, the reverse happens, making the tendency to
disagreement stronger.
The effects on the trust between the agents, on the other hand,
have a much slower dynamics when compared to the dynamics
of pi . The reason for that is trivial. While each time an agent ob-
serves another, it updates its value of pi , it updates just one of
its N values of τi j . Therefore, trust evolves very slowly, as can be
seen in Fig. 7 for a realization with only N = 100 agents. It is clear
that, even after 100 average interactions per agent (t = 100), the
system is still very close to its initial condition (every ti j = 0.5).
This happens because, in average, each value of the trust matrixτi j had only one update. This causes the high central peak in the
left panel ﬁgure, corresponding to the large number of positions
of τi j that were not updated at all. After t = 1000, that peak is
much smaller and most agents have some evaluation about how
much to trust most of others, trusting those who agree with them
and distrusting the others. This basically separates the population
in two opposing factions [45]. When no consensus emerges, both
groups are basically of the same size, except for statistical ﬂuctua-
tions and are identiﬁed on group that supports A while the other
supports B . As time goes by, trust within each group tends to 1
for all agents, while the trust between agents belonging to differ-
ent groups will go to 0. This is a slow process, though.
Although the introduction of trust allows the existence of the
two phases, the dynamics associated to τi j happens in a much
larger time scale than the dynamics of pi . That is, the decision
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before there was time enough for the trust matrix to change much.
First, agents reinforce their opinions in one direction randomly,
as they interact with one choice more than the other. Once they
start making up their minds, then they start trusting more those
they agree with and less those they disagree.
The system as a whole seems to be dominated by two opposing
forces, associated with different random walks. On one side, there
is the tendency of the average of pi to change, causing a stronger
inﬂuence towards one of the sides that would eventually lead to
an agreement. On the other side, we have the tendency of indi-
vidual values of pi to move away from the moderate region. And,
as they get close to 0 or 1, agents tend to mistrust those who
disagree with them and not change their opinions much when
faced with disagreement. If the system remains in an undecided
state long enough for the more extreme opinions to become im-
portant, polarization ensues. How much agents trust each other at
ﬁrst, therefore, determines which of these two opposing forces will
win eventually.
4. Conclusion
We have seen that, by introducing trust in the CODA model,
we obtain the realistic case where either agreement or polarization
may be observed in the long run, depending on the parameters
and initial conditions of the system. As it would be expected, the
model says that when people trust each other more, agreement
is easier to be obtained. Also the quality of the information plays
an important role, in the sense of which α or μ is closer to 0.5.
If trustworthy agents information is considered less random, agree-
ment is favored, otherwise, polarization is. This is in agreement
with precious results that showed that polarization can be more
easily maintained as a consequence of absence of interaction in an
anxiety and treat free environment [46,47,45].
Finally it is interesting to stress the different time scales in-
volved with the two processes. It is a prediction of this model and,
as such, a way to test it that, when agreement will happen, it hap-
pens comparatively fast. On the other hand, if the state of doubt
remains for very long time in the society, this allows mistrust to
build, eventually leading to polarization.
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